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Abstract
Prior to the nancial crisis mainstream monetary policy practice had become disconnected from money. We
outline the basic rationale for this development using a simple model of money and credit in which we explore
the conditions under which money matters directly for the conduct of policy. Then, drawing on Goodfriend and
McCallums (2007) DSGE model, we examine the circumstances under which money becomes more closely linked
to ination. We nd that money matters when the variance of the supply of lending dominates productivity
and the velocity of money demand. This is because amplifying the role of loans supply leads to an expansion in
aggregate demand, via a compression of the external nance premium, which is inationary. We consider a number
of alternative monetary policy rules, and nd that a rule which exploits the joint information from money and the
external nance premium performs best.
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1 Introduction
The standard, mainstream macroeconomic model (Woodford, 2003, Galí, 2008) has little, if any,
independent role for the money supply. Money is endogenous and adjusts with movements in
the demand for money. The use of the nominal short term interest rate as the instrument of
policy insulates the real economy from shocks to the money market. This insight goes back to
Poole (1970) who showed that the use of the interest rate as the instrument of policy insulates
the economy from shocks to the demand for money. More recently, Ireland (2000) has shown that
Pooles result carries over to the New Keynesian model. This dichotomy would suggest that there
will be little short term relationship between changes in the stock of money and credit and output
and ination, even though in the long run the price level will rise in proportion with the stock of
money. This paper contributes to this discussion by considering why and in what circumstances
the monetary authorities should pay attention to the monetary aggregates.
Despite the clarity of this result in the mainstream theoretical model, there is conicting
empirical evidence on the role of money and credit in business cycles. For example, Reynard (2007)
provides evidence to suggest there is a systematic empirical relationship between movements in
money and subsequent prices and output. Using data for the US, the Euro area and Switzerland he
nds that monetary developments provide information about subsequent ination. Nelson (2002)
also nds empirical evidence of a direct e¤ect of base money on output. He argues that money
may be acting as a proxy for various yields that a¤ect aggregate demand. By contrast, Ireland
(2004) provides a model in which empirical measures of real money balances must rst be adjusted
for shifts in money demand in order to isolate the e¤ects of money on output and ination. Even
when taking this into consideration, he nds that money plays a minor role in explaining the
business cycle.1
Andres et al (2006) examine the role of money using an estimated model of the Eurozone
built on a dynamic equilibrium framework. They nd that, rst, consumption is not a¤ected by
money balances. Secondly, shocks to money demand can forecast real balances, but it requires
real shocks to explain the bulk of uctuations in prices, output and interest rates. Favara and
Giordani (2009) o¤er a direct evaluation of the contribution that money can make to explaining
movements in ination and output. Using a VAR, they nd that shocks to monetary aggregates
appear to have substantial and persistent e¤ects on ination, output and interest rates.
Benk et al (2005) take a di¤erent approach and construct a measure of credit shocks and nd
the credit shocks have a role in explaining GDP. The credit shocks it is argued are the product
of legislative changes in the regulation of banks in the US. The mainstream view that narrow
denitions of money (M0 and M1) do not appear to have signicant real e¤ects draws on the early
1A modied version of the standard New Keynesian model with non-separability in preferences (Aurouba and
Schorfheide, 2011) also allows a non-negligible role for money in the determination of output and ination and
thus, in the conduct of monetary policy. However, quantitative analysis documents the irrelevance of this channel.
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work of Chari et al (1995) who found that monetary aggregates covary mainly positively with
output because money demand is primarily driven by aggregate shocks to the private economy.
Christiano et al (1999) nd that shocks to money demand measured by narrow measures of money
(M0 and M1) do not have signicant real e¤ects while shocks to M2, which involve a measure of
credit, has some signicant real e¤ects.
At rst blush the di¤erent empirical results in the literature are di¢ cult to reconcile. One
obvious possibility is that over the sample periods being used monetary policy was not always
conducted strictly along the lines of the new Keynesian framework. There, as we have already
noted, the role of the short term interest rate is central. It is certainly true for example in the
United Kingdom, there were signicant periods during which monetary aggregates were targeted
or else the exchange rate. A policy of an explicit reliance upon the short-term nominal interest rate
started only in 1992 with the formal adoption of ination targeting. It may be that these alternative
regimes impart a su¢ cient departure from the canonical new Keynesian model for e¤ects of money
to show up in the data. Moreover, the European Central Bank has always followed a two-pillar
approach. The rst of these gives a prominent role to a broadly based assessment of the outlook
for future price developmentsand the second pillar relies on a monetary analysis of trends (Stark,
2008).
But we are interested in explaining the results with reference to the prominence of shifts in
the supply of bank credit.2 The role of banks, other nancial institutions and the nancial system
- that provide loans and help determine asset prices - are often given particular prominence in
discussions on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.3 And so a signicant corpus of
economists have not given up entirely on the idea that the monetary aggregates can sometimes
contain information about the future state of the economy, as well as about the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.4 To borrow an analogy from Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) the ow
of money and private securities through the economy is analogous to the ow of blood...money
is the blood that dispatches resources in response to those (price) signals (p. 5). More recently,
and especially in the light of recent turbulence in world nancial markets, economists have been
re-examining the role that money, and more generally credit, can play independently of the policy
rate. One avenue we explore in this paper, is motivated by the role of money as a suppler of
payment services to credit constrained consumers. The price, as a premium above the policy rate,
of such loans reects the marginal costs to banks of their supply and so it responds to increases in
the e¢ ciency of supply relative to the demand for loans. This relative price can move out of line
with the policy rate set by the central bank when there are independent sources of uctuations
in the ability of banks to supply liquidity, for example, as a result of their e¢ ciency in screening
2Recently, Chadha et al (2010) have found a signicant role for supply shocks in explaining broad money
movements prior to and subsequent to the nancial crisis.
3See Bernanke et al (1999) for a clear exposition.
4See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) for a discussion of these issues.
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loans (monitoring) or the value of posted collateral.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we consider the role of money in a highly stylised
macro model and show that, in accordance with with the mainstream literature, that shocks to
money demand do not a¤ect output and ination. We then go on to consider a version of this
model with credit following Bernanke and Blinder (1988). There is an external nance premium
(EFP) so that there is not always a one to one correspondence between the interest rate set by
policymakers and that which lenders pay. In this case the monetary authorities cannot completely
insulate the real economy from shocks in nancial markets, compared to the situation in which
only money demand shocks matter. This leads to a modication of the standard Taylor principle
for the stability of the model under an interest rate rule. In particular factors that determine
the supply of loans can alter the appropriate policy response to ination. To help to esh out
this insight with a more fully specied and micro-founded model, in Section 3, we re-examine the
role of money for policy in the context of Goodfriend and McCallums (2007) model which adds
a banking sector to a DSGE model.5 This means that shocks in the nancial sector that a¤ect
the external nance premium can now alter output and ination. In Section 4, using an impulse
response analysis we show that under an ination targeting policy, money and nancial spreads
become negatively correlated when shocks to the supply of bank loans dominate those to money
demand or to productivity in the real economy. Section 5 explores the conditions under which
money provides a reliable signal about ination and output and considers a number of simple
augmented rules to capture the signal. We observe that when supply shocks dominate in the
money market, spreads and money move in opposite directions and so one rule that has attractive
properties is one that employs information about the di¤erence in money and spreads. We show
that such a rule is better able to stabilise the economy compared to a simple ination targeting
rule when there are shocks to nancial markets. Section 6 concludes and o¤ers some directions
for future work.
2 Money, Credit and Interest Rate Rules
In the rst part of this section we take a stylised version of the New Keynesian model and show the
standard result that as long as the policy rule satises the Taylor principle, output and ination
can be insulated from money demand shocks. In the second part we go on to re-examine this
result in a NK version of Bernanke and Blinders (1988) credit model, in which nancial spreads
also matter for the level of output. We now nd that monetary policy also needs to be responsive
to conditions in credit markets which we capture by the external nance premium (Meier and
Müller, 2005) in order to stabilise output and ination. First, consider a simple model of money
demand (for which supply is implicitly perfectly elastic) appended to a standard New Keynesian
5See Curdia and Woodford (2010) for an alternative take on the importance of the EFP.
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framework (see King, 2002), which uses a monopolistically competitive supply side with Calvo
price setting. And examine, in this simple setting, that the stock of money plays is essentially
decoupled and plays no role in the determination of output and ination.
In the simple New Keynesian model all variables are expressed as log deviations from steady-
state. Equation (1) gives aggregate demand, yt, as a function of this periods expectation, Et; of
demand next period, yt+1, and of the expected real interest, where Rt is the policy rate, Ett+1 is
the next period expectation of ination and  is the intertemporal rate of substitution in output.6
Equation (2) is the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates current ination,
t, to discounted expected next period ination, where  is the subjective discount factor, and is
proportional to the deviation of aggregate demand from supply, where  is the slope of the Phillips
curve.7 In equation (3) real balances, ht   pt, are held in proportion to demand, yt, and inversely
with the opportunity cost of holding non-interest paying money, Rt, with a semi-elasticity, .
Equation (4) is a simple interest rate-based rule that is used to stabilise ination about its steady
state value with the weight on ination given by . The supply side of the economy, ~yt, which
we interpret as the ex-price level of output is given by (5). Finally,  is the fraction of rms that
hold prices xed and so (1  ) is the fraction which are given a signal to re-price as a mark-up
over marginal costs thus ination in equation (6) is simply the ratio of rms that re-price at the
new price level, pt, relative to those that cannot re-price.
The system is subject to stochastic shocks, A;t, B;t, C;t, D;t, E;t which are respectively to
demand, mark-up, money markets, monetary policy and to aggregate supply.
yt = Etyt+1    (Rt   Ett+1) + A;t (1)
t = Ett+1 +  (yt   ~yt) + B;t (2)
ht   pt = yt   Rt + C;t (3)
Rt = t + D;t (4)
~yt = E;t (5)
t =
1  

pt: (6)
We can substitute (4) into (1), (5) into (2) and solve (6) for pt and substitute into (3) to give
6This intertemporal equation also operates as the basic asset pricing equation in a New-Keynesian model.
7The term  is related to two deep parameters in the underlying Calvo-Yun model (see Yun, 1996): the probability
of rms maintaining a xed price in the next period,  , and the subjective discount factor, : In ination space 
can be shown to be equal to (1 )(1 ) and thus in price space, with the deviation in the price level proportional
to ination (see equation 6), the Phillips curve becomes: pt = Etpt+1 + (1  ) (yt   y^t) + 1  A;t: Under either
formulation ination or the price level is less responsive to the output gap as  ! 1:
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us a system of three di¤erence equations that can be written in vector form, if we suppress the
stochastic errors, as:
Etxt+1 = xt; (7)
where the transpose of the vector of state variables xt is:
x
0
t 
h
yt t ht
i
;
where  is a 3 x 3 matrix. The existence or not of a unique solution for xt, as is well understood,
given the forcing processes, t,8 will depend upon matching the number of eigenvalues of the
matrix  within the unit circle with the number of predetermined state variables. And typically
the coe¢ cients of the policy rule, (4), are set to ensure local determinacy.9
What concerns us here is the role, if any, that money, ht, plays in this economy. We note that
the matrix, , can be written in block form:
 =
264 


+ 1     0
 

1

0
1  
  ( + (   1) ( + ))  + 1  ( + (   1) ( + )) 0
375
=
"
A 0
C D
#
:
Where A is 22, C is 12, D is a 11 null matrix and 0 is a 21 null column vector. The block
triangularity of  means that its eigenvalues are simply given by the eigenvalues of A; referring
to
h
t yt
i
and D, referring to [ht] : Also the determinacy of  follows from the determinacy
of A given D is a null matrix. In this case, with both ination and output non-predetermined,
determinacy will require A to have two eigenvalues outside the unit circle and for the trace Tr(A)
to be positive. This requires the Det(A)   Tr(A) >  1, for which a necessary and su¢ cient
condition is that:
 > 1: (8)
Which is the familiar condition that for stability real rates must increase (decrease) by more than
any positive (negative) ination shock. This solution is recursive in that as long as ination and
output are pinned down to a unique solution path then the money stock (and the price level) is
(are) also determined in each period. In other words there is no role here for the money stock to
destabilise the economy independently. This is essentially the New Keynesian generalisation of the
Poole assignment. Using the short term interest rate as the instrument of policy the real sector
can be insulated from shocks to the demand for money. Moreover, shocks to aggregate demand
can also be o¤set completely (Galí, 2008).
8Which is an analagous 3 x 1 vector for the shocks.
9See Woodford (2003) for a comprehensive treatment of this problem.
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2.1 Credit in a NK Model
We now consider how a primitive banking sector can be introduced into the NK model using the
approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Aggregate demand in equation (1), now depends on
the interest rate on loans in the credit market, Rmt , rather than directly on the policy rate, Rt, for
which we will now solve:
yt = Etyt+1    (Rmt   Ett+1) + A;t: (1)
The Phillips curve is (2) as above. So the interest rate on loans is determined by market
clearing, for which we will now solve. The real supply of loans by banks, lst  pt, depends positively
on the external nance premium (Rmt   Rt) and on (real) bank deposits, (dt   pt) where c can
be interpreted as a measure of the extent of leverage of loans over deposits, while the costs of
monitoring or the availability of collateral would be reected in c.
lst   pt = c(Rmt  Rt) + c(dt   pt) + ms;t: (9)
We now turn to the real demand for loans, ldt   pt, which depends negatively on the external
nance premium,
ldt   pt =  c(Rmt  Rt) + md;t: (10)
Bank deposits, replacing money demand in (3), are held to nance output,
(dt   pt) = yt: (3)
Equating lst = l
d
t and suppressing stochastic terms, we can solve for the market interest rate in
terms of the policy rate, which is set by (4), and the parameters of loan supply:
Rmt = Rt  
c
c + c
yt = Rt   cyt (11)
Solving for the equilibrium in the market for loans, and using the policy rule in (4) we can
reduce the model to the two equation system
Etyt+1 + Ett+1 = yt (1  c) + t (12)
Ett+1 =   (yt   eyt) + t; (13)
where c =
c
c+c
. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the stability of this model is now:
 > 1 + c
(1  )

: (14)
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In contrast to the standard New Keynesian model the policymaker needs to be more responsive
to ination in order to o¤set the e¤ect of developments in credit markets and more so when banks
increase their loans supply relative to their deposit base. Hence the new condition (14) tells us
that if money (or credit) is provided at an interest rate that di¤ers from the policy rate, Rt, which
itself varies with the costs of monitoring and the availability of collateral (or with the extent
of leverage in the banking sector) the policymaker has to o¤set that spread as well as ensuring
the policy rate increases or decreases the real rate. In other words the price at which money is
supplied by the banking system might matter. The model examined in the following section gives
us a micro-founded route to the result here and starts to ll in the missing arguments of a typical
NK model by suggesting that the money/credit a¤ects both aggregate demand and policy.
3 A General Equilibrium Monetary Model with Banking
and Credit
As pointed out by Goodhart (2007) and by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) money (aggregates) should
be be made to mattter in general equilibrium models as they a¤ect consumption decisions of
liquidity constrained households and the spreads across several nancial instruments and assets.
And as Woodford (2007) states money matters in such circumstances as it may be the root
of disequilibrium and instability in the economy originating from the nancial sector. A way
to incorporate money and nancial spreads into a general equilibrium setting is to study the
banking sector proposed by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).10 The main feature of the model
is the inclusion of a banking sector alongside households, production and the monetary authority.
The model by GM complements the traditional accelerator e¤ect (Bernanke et al., 1999) with an
attenuator e¤ect, which is present in the model because monitoring e¤ort is drawn into the banking
sector in response to the expansion of consumption, which is accompanied by an expansion of bank
lending that raises the marginal cost of loans and the external nance premium.
The main feature of this model is the underpinning of household, production and the monetary
authority with a banking sector. Households, who are liquidity constrained, decide the amount of
consumption and the amount of labor they wish to supply to the goods production sector and to
the banking sector. They also demand deposits, money (liquidity), as a function of the amount of
consumption they wish to nance. The production sector is standard (Yun, 1996), characterised
by monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, subject
to productivity shocks. Prot maximising rms decide the amount of production they wish to
supply and the demand for labour. By clearing the household and production sectors we can dene
the equilibrium in the labour market and in the goods market. These two sectors also provide the
standard relationship for the riskless interest rate and the bond rate.
10See also Gilchrists comment (2008) on Goodfriend and McCallums model (2007).
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Finally, the banking sector matches deposit demand from liquidity constrained consumers
with a loan producing technology. Specically, banks substitute monitoring work for collateral in
supplying loans. More monitoring is achieved by increasing the number of people employed in the
banking sector and therefore reducing employment in the goods production sector. A fractional
reserve requirement with a xed reserve-deposit ratio is assumed. Given this technology banks
decide on the amount of loans they can supply and the amount of monitoring required. At the
same time householdsconsumption is a¤ected by the availability of loanable funds. The Appendix
lists all the model equations.
3.1 Consumption and Collateral
But we can summarize the relationship for consumers in the GM framework around an equilibrium
steady state c in the reduced form (subscript t denotes deviations from steady state and variables
with no subscript are steady-state parameters):11
ct =

vtc+ (1  )(mt + a2t) + 

b
b+ k1
bt +
k1
b+ k1
(qt + a3t)

b+ k1
b(1  ) + k1

: (15)
With the presence of a cash in advance constraint, a shock to velocity, vt; will increase consumption.
Consumption, ct, is also positively a¤ected by the amount of monitoring work, mt; where  is the
share of collateral in the loans production function and (1 ) represents the share of monitoring
costs. It is also a¤ected by the amount of collateral represented by bonds, bt, and capital whose
value is given by qt. A positive shock to monitoring, a2t; by increasing the e¢ ciency with which
banks produce loans, increases the supply of loans and therefore consumption. Similarly a negative
shock to collateral, a3t; by reducing the price of capital, qt; will negatively a¤ect consumption. The
parameters c, b and k1 represent the steady-state fraction of consumption in output, the holding
of bonds and a composite parameter reecting the inferiority of capital compared to bonds as
liquidity.12 The demand for monitoring work is given by:
mt =  wt   (1  )c
mw
(ct +


t): (16)
A higher wage, wt; will reduce the resources devoted to monitoring. Similarly monitoring will be
a¤ected by the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal value of householdsfunds, t:
The steady state parameters, m, w, and 

represent the steady-state proportions of employment
in the banking sector, the level of the real wage, and the ratio of the weight of consumption in the
utility function relative to the steady-state shadow value of consumption.
With a banking sector of this type in the model, we can link money and asset prices directly
11The model is fully derived in the extended technical appendix available from the authorswebsite.
12The parameter k1 =
(1+)kK
c is a function of the ratio of consumption to output, c, of the parameter reecting
the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; of steady-state capital, K; and of the trend growth rate, .
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to output and ination, as consumption, which accounts for most of the uctuations in output
in this model, is closely dependent on money market perturbations, the development of banking
technology and asset prices outcomes. Now money and lending a¤ect consumption, the level of
economic activity and will also have implications for asset prices.
A key term here is the marginal value of collateralized lending, 
t; which increases as
consumption rises and falls as collateral becomes more widely available:

t =
k2
b+ k2
(ct   qt   a3t)  b
b+ k2
bt: (17)

t depends on the value of the collateral, qt and bt, on a collateral shock, a3t; and on consumption,
ct. Higher levels of consumption increase the marginal value of capital and hence the collateral
value, qt: The increase in collateral value leads to more borrowing and more consumption. The
parameter k2 is again a composite coe¢ cient similar to k1:13
The marginal value of collateralized lending also feeds back into the capital asset price equation,
qt:
qt = (1 + 1) (Ett+1   t) + 1Etqt+1  
k

c
(ct + t) + (18)
k
(

c
  1) (
t + a3t) + 1Et [mct+1 + (1  ) (nt+1 + a1t+1)] :
In (18) the marginal value of collateralized lending, 
t; potentially can amplify asset price volatility
and magnify the response of the economy to both real and nancial shocks. Both real, a1;
and nancial shocks, a3; directly feed back into asset prices alongside the expected marginal
productivity of capital [mct+1 + (1  ) (nt+1 + a1t+1)] where mct+1 denotes marginal cost in
period t + 1,  is the share of capital in the goods production function and n is employment
in the goods production sector. Similarly expected asset prices, Etqt+1; the change in the shadow
value of households funds (Ett+1   t) alongside the wedge between the marginal utility of
consumption and the shadow value of funds also a¤ect the value of capital, qt. The parameter 1
is a composite function of the depreciation rate of capital while the parameter 1 is a composite
function of steady-state marginal costs, of steady-state employment in the goods sector and of the
capital share in the production of goods.14
13The parameter k2 = kKc is a function of k, of steady-state capital, K; and of the steady-state ratio of
consumption, c:
14The parameter 1 =
(1 )
1+ is a function of the discount factor, ; of the depreciation rate of capital, ; and of
the trend growth rate, : The parameter 1 =
mc
1+ (
n
K )
1  is function of steady-state employment in goods sector,
n, of steady-state marginal costs, mc; of steady-state capital, K; and of the parameter reecting the capital share
in the production function of the goods sector, . Details of the derivation are reported in the technical appendix.
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3.2 Interest Rate Spreads
The last building block involves the determination of interest rate spreads. The benchmark
theoretical interest rate RT is simply a standard intertemporal nominal pricing kernel, priced
o¤ real consumption and ination. It can be written as one-period Fisher equation:
RTt = Et(t   t+1) + Ett+1: (19)
The di¤erence between the interbank rate R and RT is the external nance premium, which is the
premium paid by the private sector for loans:
RLt  Rt = [vt + wt +mt   ct]| {z }
EFPt
: (20)
The external nance premium, EFPt; is the real marginal cost of loan management, and it is
increasing in velocity, vt; real wages, wt; monitoring work in the banking sector, mt; and decreasing
in consumption, ct.15 The external nance premium is also dependent on the share of collateral
costs in loan costs () ; and reserve requirements (rr); but as these two parameters are both
constant in this model they do not appear in the log-linearization.
The yield on government bonds is the benchmark rate, RT ; minus the liquidity service on
bonds:
RBRBt = R
TRTt +



c
(ct + t) 


c
  1



t

; (21)
where (ct + t) measures the households marginal utility relative to the households shadow value
of funds while 
 is the marginal value of the collateral. In the model these key margins - the real
marginal cost of loan management versus the liquidity service yield - determine the behavior of
spreads.
Finally the monetary authorities, who set the interbank lending rate, are assumed to follow a
simple ination targeting rule in the rst instance:
Rt = t + t: (22)
In this section we have outlined, briey the key elements of the GM model and explained how it
links explicitly output to developments in the monetary sector and how the interaction between
those sectors determine nancial spreads. In the following section we shall analyze the key
responses of the model to a series of shocks and try to infer from this what is the relationship
between money and ination, and what role nancial spreads play.
15The collateralized external nance premium is simply the uncollateralized external nance premium multiplied
by (1  ), i.e. the share of monitoring costs in loan costs, and it is less than the uncollateralized external nance
premium. As the shares  and (1  ) are constant both the collateralized and uncollateralized versions of the
EFP coincide when log linearized.
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4 Model Results
The model is solved using the solution methods of King and Watson (1998) who also provide
routines to derive the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to di¤erent shocks, to obtain
asymptotic variance and covariances and to simulate the data. The simulation is carried out by
running a random number generator in Matlab. Following a xed random seed, we generate a
set of normal distributed exogenous shocks of length K = 10; 000. These random shocks are fed
into the recursive law of motion of key variables for which see the Technical Annex. For the
impulse response analysis and simulation exercise we examine the e¤ects of real and nancial
shocks described in Table A3. We also report the choice of moments for the forcing variables.
These are standard parameters in the literature.
4.1 Calibration
Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we choose the consumption weight in utility, ; to
give 1/3 of available time in either goods or banking services production.16 We also set the
relative share of capital and labour in goods production  to be 0.36. We choose the elasticity of
substitution of di¤erentiated goods, , to be equal to 11. The discount factor, ; is set to 0.99
which is the canonical quarterly value while the mark-up coe¢ cient in the Phillips curve, ; is set
to 0.05. The depreciation rate, , is set to be equal to 0.025 while the trend growth rate, ; is set
to 0.005 which corresponds to 2% per year. The steady-state value of the ratio of bond holdings
to GDP, b, is set to 0.56 as of the third quarter of 2005.
The parameters linked to money and banking are dened as follows. Velocity at its steady
state level is dened as the ratio of US GDP to M3 as of the fourth quarter of 2005, yielding 0.31.
The fractional reserve requirement, rr ; is set at 0.005, measured as the ratio of US bank reserves
to M3 as at the fourth quarter 2005. The fraction of collateral, ; in loan production is set to 0.65,
the coe¢ cient reecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; is set to 0.2 while the production
coe¢ cient of loan, F; is set to 9. The low value of capital productivity reects the fact that usually
banks use a higher fraction of monitoring services and rely less on capital as collateral. Turning
to the parameters in the various policy rules,17 we set the coe¢ cient on ination with ination
targeting, T , to be equal to 50 as in GM in order to reect a strong response to ination and a
smoothing parameter, , equal to 0.8; the coe¢ cient on ination with a Taylor rule, , is set to
1.5 while the coe¢ cient on output, y, is set to 0.5 as in GM. For the rule which responds to asset
prices we assume a coe¢ cient on asset price growth, q, equal to 0.5.
16Tables A1 and A2 of the appendix report the values for the parameters and steady-state values of relevant
variables.
17The policy rules are described in more detail in Section 5.
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4.2 Implied Steady-States
With these parameters values we see that the steady state of labour input, n; is 0.31 which is close
to 1/3 as required. The ratio of time working in the banking service sector, m
m+n
, is 1.9% under the
benchmark calibration, not far from the 1.6%, share of total US employment in depository credit
intermediation as of August 2005. As the steady-states are computed at zero ination we can
interpret all the rates as real rates. The riskless rate, RT ; is 6% per annum. The policy rate, R;
is 0.84% per annum which is close to the 1% per year average short-term real rate (see Campbell,
1999). The government bond rate, RB; is 2.1% per annum. Finally the collateralised external
nance premium, RL R, is around 2% per annum which is in line with the average spread of the
prime rate over the federal funds rate in the US.18
4.3 Examining the Role of Money in this Economy
In this section we describe, briey, the e¤ects of a series of shocks to productivity, velocity and
to two types of shocks to the nancial sector.19 As is implied by Section 2, the dynamics of the
model suggests that a key role is played by the loan rate, the external nance premium and policy
rate, as a regulator of demand. For example, any shock that raises collateral value will increase
the supply of loans. At the same time the collateral shock will increase the demand for deposits
and therefore the amount of monitoring work that needs to be carried out by banks. So the
increase in the amount of employment in monitoring work will increase the real marginal cost of
the management of loans and so the positive e¤ect of higher collateral will be attenuated. What
we try to do here is simply assess the impact of some key driving forces both on the quantity of
money in this model and also the external nance premium at which that money is supplied.
4.3.1 Goods productivity
A shock, a1; to goods productivity,20 under the ination targeting rule, can be stabilised. Hence
hours worked in the goods production sector, n; and the benchmark rate RT are almost invariant
to the shock.21 However c; w; q; m are all higher. In fact with hours worked in goods production
relatively stable, increased productivity shows up as higher consumption c and higher real wages w:
Also increases in q reect a higher marginal product of capital. The increase in monitoring hours
m reects the increased demand for and supply of deposits. The combined e¤ect is to increase the
18The equations for the steady-states are listed the extended technical appendix available on request. The solution
for the steady-states uses a nonlinear routine in Maple and the le is also available on request.
19The diagrams of the impulse responses to mark-up, money and government shocks are available on request.
Those discussed here are available in the technical appendix which can be found on the authorswebpages.
20The benchmark model has 20 endogenous variables fc; n;m;w; q; P; ;mc;H; b;
; EFP; RT ; RB ; R;RL;
RD; ; ; Tg, 5 lagged variables fP 1;H 1; c 1; b 1; RB 1g and 7 exogenous shocks fa1; a2; a3; "; ; ; ug. We report
only the results of the four shocks a1; a2; a3; v:
21For RTt this happens as R
T
t = t + Ett+1   Ett+1 where the ination rate  and changes in  are almost
zero.
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EFP. But the movement of money (deposits/loans) in the same direction as the external nance
premium implies that money would be a poor indicator of nancial conditions, as the increase in
money does not imply that there has been an inationary monetary expansion.
4.3.2 Banking productivity
Again under an ination targeting rule, a shock to banking productivity, a2 is stabilised and
therefore so is the benchmark interest rate. Because of higher banking productivity, monitoring
hours, m; decline while there is little e¤ect on the value of collateral q; on consumption c and on
real wages w: The combined e¤ect, by reducing the marginal costs of loan supply is to decrease
the EFP. In this case therefore money might indicate some loosening of nancial conditions.
4.3.3 Collateral prices
Under ination targeting, a positive shock to collateral, a3; leads to stable ination and benchmark
interest rate, RT . There are small increases in c and w: As we have a positive shock to collateral
there is a fall in monitoring hours m, which dominates the costs of loans supply: The overall e¤ect
in general equilibrium is to reduce the EFP, alongside an increase in the quantity of money. In these
circumstances, the increase in money is associated with some loosening of nancial conditions.
4.3.4 Money velocity
With an ination targeting rule, a positive shock to velocity v increases c; w; n and ination.
Because the capital/labour ratio is lower, the price of capital q rises while hours of monitoring, m,
decrease as the existing stock of money works harder. The joint e¤ect is a decrease in the EFP
and a fall in the money supply.22 In this case, as with the productivity shock, money does not
turn out to be a good indicator of inationary pressure.
4.3.5 The information content of money
Overall we nd that money plays a crucial role in driving the EFP when the banking sector itself is
the source of the shock (i.e. monitoring e¢ ciency and/or collateral shocks) with banks becoming
more or less able to supply a given quantity of loans. It is this independent source of supply
shocks to the loanable funds market which drives the EFP in the opposite direction to that of
the quantity of loans and so can act to compress (unwind) yields when there liquidity becomes
abundant (scarce).
22The liquidity service yield is sensitive to ination dynamics and as these are relatively stable here the yield
varies little, we explore this spread in other work. But note that in each case the direction of the liquidity service
yield (not shown) is well explained by the direction of the external nance premium and so we concentrate on
understanding the responses of the EFP to shocks.
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We can examine the information content of money more formally in the GM model by
examining some properties of the simulated data. We can simulate the model under the benchmark
case and for illustrative purposes we can also raise the standard deviation of a2 and a3 shocks
from 1 to 5% to examine what happens when such shocks are dominant. Table 1 - for the
benchmark shocks and banking dominant shocks - shows, on the left hand side of the table the
lead, contemporaneous and lagged correlation between money and ination and output from HP
ltered simulations. The main di¤erence in the two cases is that when banking shocks dominate,
money has positive rather than negative lead information for ination. Following King (2002), the
nal two columns show the sum of contemporaneous money and 4 lags of money in a regression
of ination and of output on lags of ination, output and money. We can see that money has
signicant information for ination in both cases but when banking shocks are dominant, money
has positive information, in the sense that positive money growth leads to higher ination. It
would therefore seem appropriate for central banks to place emphasis on monetary aggregates
when banking sector or loans supply shocks dominate.
5 Reconsidering Simple Policy Rules
The previous section has shown that monetary and nancial conditions might well matter when
setting monetary policy, over and above the policy rate. We concentrate on comparing shocks to
the supply of banks loans involving collateral or monitoring costs. Note that a negative shock
to the nancial system originating in a rise in the cost of monitoring loans or a reduction in the
collateral of borrowers has a opposite-signed impact on money and on the external nance premium
- in this case money will contract and the spread widen. This suggests that the information on
the spread and money might be used to inform monetary policy, that is to say as well as reacting
to ination directly the central bank can also respond to the spread.
Before considering this point in detail, we assess the e¤ectiveness of the various policy rules
proposed by Gilchrist and Saito (2006). We use the following rules for comparison.
Targeting Rule
Rt = 
T
t + t: (23)
The policy rate is set by a feedback rule responding to ination, t, with parameters, 
T
 , where
we assume that the policymaker targets zero percent ination.
Money Rule. We also consider an alternative rule where the central bank controls the growth
of high powered money:
ht = 
Hht 1 + t (24)
where ht = log(Ht) and ht denotes the growth rate of Ht. In (24) we assume that 0 <j H j< 1
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while t is the random component of policy behaviour.
Taylor Rule with Ination and Output. We assume, as also in GM, an alternative rule
where policy-makers respond to output, yt, and ination, t; while also smoothing interest rates:
Rt = Rt 1 + (1  )(t + yyt) + t (25)
with 0 <  < 1: In contrast to the ination targeting rule (23) where the policymaker targets zero
ination, the weight on ination, , is lower at 1.5.
Policy Rule with Asset Price Growth. We also consider, as in Gilchrist and Saito (2006),
an alternative formulation of (25) where the policy-maker responds to the growth rate of observed
asset prices, qt:
Rt = Rt 1 + (1  )(t + qqt) + t (26)
Augmented Rule. As an illustration of how policymakers might seek to respond directly to
supply side shocks to the supply of loans - as suggested by equation (14) - we now assume that
the monetary authority augments its ination targeting rule with a term in the di¤erence between
the external nance premium and money to capture the impact of the supply of money:
Rt = 
T
t + m(ht   EFPt) + t; (27)
where h is money and EFP is the external nance premium. In this case when there is a demand
shock, ht and EFPt will move in the same direction and the augmented rule will have the same
e¤ect as an ination targeting rule. But when the shock is to the supply of loans, money and the
external nance premium will move in opposite directions, thereby altering the interest rate set
by the monetary authority.
In the next section we assess the policy outcomes both in terms of the volatility of output and
ination and a welfare approximation of the representative household from the implementation of
a rule that targets zero ination versus alternative rules that respond to aggregate demand, money,
asset prices and the augmented rule. The welfare analysis will allow us to better understand how
the policy maker should respond when banking shocks dominate.
5.1 Welfare Analysis
We rst consider a welfare criterion often used to assess policy alternatives that depends only on
the variance of output and ination (e.g. Galí (2008)) and employs a standard loss function:
Lst =
1
2
2 +
1
2
2y: (28)
Given the primitive utility function of GM model, we also trace out the direct welfare
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consequences for the representative household. The use of the approximation allows us to
quantify precisely the welfare rankings arising from each of our policy rules, possibly allowing
some normative statements. We derive a quadratic loss function using a second-order Taylor
approximation to utility by using the labour demand function, marginal cost function and sales-
production constraint to substitute for household consumption.23 Once re-ordered and simplied
we are left with a loss function with relevant terms in the variances of consumption, ination,
wages, employment in the goods sector and the marginal cost.24
Ut   U =  1
2
E0
1X
t=0
tLt +O3 (29)
with Lt =
1
2
"
2c +

(1 )
 
n
c
  w
c

2 
w
c
2w   nc2n + mcc 2mc
#
where  = (1 )(1 )

1 
1+( 1) .
In the next section we will evaluate each policy rule under standard loss function (28) and the
welfare approximation (29) when the standard deviation of the nancial shocks rise.
5.2 Policy Experiment
Using both the welfare criteria, we can calculate the loss under each policy rule when we increase
the standard deviation of banking shocks and then rank them using the metric laid out by Gilchrist
and Saito (2006).
Gain(x) =
L(Less Stabilising Policy)  L(Rule x)
L(Less Stabilising Policy)  L(Most Stabilising Policy) (30)
The gain is dened as the di¤erence between the loss, L, obtained from pursuing the policy rule
x versus the less stabilising rule (the asset rule), divided by the di¤erence between outcomes
obtained from pursuing the most stabilising rule (the augmented rule), versus the asset rule.
Doing so enables us to summarise the result of our policy comparison: if the relative gain is above
(below) one, the policy in question is better (worse) than the augmented rule. If it is negative than
the given policy actually performs worse than the benchmark. In Table 2 we can see that as we
increase the size of banking shocks the asset-price rule performs worst relative to the augmented
rule because it does not distinguish between demand or supply shock driven changes in asset price.
23The additive nature of our households utility function allows us to take a Taylor expansion of each term and
substitute it back into the original function. The labour demand function is then rearranged for monitoring work, a
second order expansion taken and substitution made. This process is then repeated for the marginal cost equation.
Following Galí (2008) we substitute the resulting linear term in goods sector employment for a second order term
in ination using the sales equal net production constraint.
24The welfare approximation is reported the Technical Appendix and draws on Chadha, Corrado and Meaning
(2012).
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By contrast the gain from a money rule rises, and while it is inferior to the augmented rule over
the range we report, it is approaching the augmented rule when shocks to the supply side of the
banking sector are particularly large relative to productivity and velocity shocks.25
Focussing on the augmented rule, we now trace out the e¤ect on the policy losses of a steadily
rising ratio of nancial (monitoring, mon, and collateral, col) to real and monetary shocks in the
model outlined in Section 3. The exercise here is to vary the ratio of the standard deviation of
nancial to real and monetary shocks, m, dened as:
m :
mon + col
prod + vel + mrk + mp + gov
: (31)
In Figure 1 we vary on the x-axis the loading m on the spread in the augmented rule, holding
the relative standard deviation of the shocks xed26 and report the loss given by the welfare
approximation (29). We note that the loss, L, is initially declining in m. And so it seems clear
that over some range when nancial shocks are dominant ination can be better stabilised. For this
illustrative calculation the standard deviation is minimised at around m = 1.
27 This simulation
echoes the analytical result in Section 2, equation (14), which shows how the policy rule needs to
o¤set those factors that might increase the external nance premium. In this simulation at least,
the Central Bank best achieves the stabilisation of ination by exactly o¤setting any narrowing
or widening of the spread between the external nance premium and money.
5.3 Money under alternative rules
The correlations between ination, money and the EFP are tabulated for the two di¤erent policy
rules in Table 3. Along the diagonals we show the standard deviation of money, ination and
the EFP for the benchmark simulation and for the banking shocks dominant simulation. In
the benchmark case the standard deviations of money and EFP are not altered greatly by the
augmented rule, suggesting that the augmented rule does not help stabilise the economy over and
above a simple rule. However, when banking shocks dominate, the correlation between money and
ination becomes positive and the correlation between the external nance premium and money
becomes negative. But when with bank dominant shocks the augmented rule is adopted, the
correlation between money and ination is once more negative and the correlation between money
25In terms of the Poole (1970) optimal choice of monetary policy instrument, it is clear that for su¢ cently large
shocks to the supply side of the nancial system, the standard assignment may be reversed.
26We set the standard deviation of the banking shocks to 0.05 and x the standard deviations of the real and
monetary shocks to their benchmark values as in Table 3. This gives a minimum of m equal to 0.54 when the
the standard deviation of the two banking shocks is set to 0.01 and a maximum of m equal to 2.73 when the the
standard deviation of the two banking shocks is set to 0.05.
27How the central bank should measure money and the EFP in reality, given the preponderance of possible
measures, and then learnby about the appropriate weight on m constructing priors and updating posteriors we
leave to future work.
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and the EFP very small, as interest rates respond to money growth and to the EFP. Under the
augmented rule, with a predominance of banking shocks, the volatility of money and particularly
ination are reduced compared to the ination only rule.
We treat the evidence here as illustrative of the extent to which an augmented rule of this type,
which accounts for the joint information from money and nancial spreads, may help stabilise a
monetary economy. The identication of this information involves the simple insight that money
growth and nancial spreads will move in opposite directions under supply shocks to nancial
markets and, provided a suitable measure of money (or liquidity) and a constellation of nancial
spreads can be located, some weight might be given to a rule of this form for monetary policy
analysis.
5.4 The Augmented Rule and the Economy
The impulse responses when this augmented rule (m = 1) is used are shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The results for both the augmented (solid) and benchmark (dotted) rule are plotted. We conne
ourselves to depicting the e¤ects of a shock to collateral and to monitoring.28 Figure 2 shows that
with a positive collateral shock and the benchmark rule there is an increase in consumption, goods
sector employment and a fall in monitoring employment. With the augmented rule the e¤ect on
ination is largely ameliorated. The e¤ect on asset prices is reversed, as there is a smaller increase
in goods employment and capital does not become as scarce. The e¤ect on the EFP is the same
in both cases but the augmented rule helps to short circuit the e¤ects of the supply shock on
ination, asset prices and bank lending. For the shock to monitoring, shown in Figure 3, the e¤ect
is to better stabilise the economy with smaller consumption, real wage and ination deviations.
Again the smaller increase in good sector employment means that capital does not become quite
so scarce in the case of the augmented rule and there is a very small fall rather than an increase
in the asset price.
6 Conclusions
Disruptions to nancial markets since August 2007 have led to the widening of spreads and a
signicant contraction in the availability of money and credit to the private sector. To some
extent this is the mirror of the situation in previous years when nancial spreads narrowed as
money and credit became more ample. The role of money to both originate as well as reect or
amplify shocks seem especially important when there are shocks to the supply of loans. When
setting monetary policy, central bankers monitor monetary developments (to varying degrees) but
there seems to be little clear guidance as to how this information is to be used, if at all.
28The results for shocks to productivity and velocity are available on request.
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In this paper we have analysed how a standard ination targeting rule is altered in the presence
of a credit channel and we nd that when credit is supplied procyclically simple ination targeting
may not be su¢ cient to stabilise the economy. We then examined the role of money in a DSGE
model with an integrated banking sector that supplies loans and accepts deposits along the lines
of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)29 and established the pivotal role of money and the external
nance premium. While in normal circumstances money may convey little extra information to a
Central Bank about the state of the economy over and above that in ination, this is not true when
there are dominant shocks to the supply of credit arising from changes in the value of collateral or
the costs of monitoring a loan portfolio.30 In these circumstances, if the Central Bank responds
in some measure to opposing movements in money and the external nance premium, a much
greater degree of control of ination can be achieved and so money can clearly matter.31
We have not necessarily captured all of the features of the present crisis or the boom that
preceded it, since the external nance premium in this paper is conned to the relationship between
banks and the private sector. Nevertheless, it is clear that an important role has also been played
in recent monetary policy developments by supply of money or credit at a nance premium internal
to the nancial system.32 A model that captures other nancial premia and other constituents of
broad money or more generally liquidity would still lead to similar results to those in this paper,
that is, the Central Bank ought to respond to shocks to the supply of money and credit when
setting monetary policy.
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Model Appendix
A The Linearised Model
The model33 is composed of the following linearised equations.34
Supply of Labour:
n
(1  n m)bnt + m(1  n m) bmt   bt   bwt = 0 (A1)
Demand for Labour: bmt + bwt + (1  )c
mw
bct + 

bt = 0 (A2)
Supply of Banking Services:35
bct = bvtc+ (1  )(a2t + bmt) + (A3)


bc
bc+ (1 + )kK
(bct +bbt) + kK(1 + )
bc+ (1 + )kK
(a3t + bqt)
reported in the main text as:
bct = ( v^tc+ (1  )(m^t + a2t)+ h b
b+k1
b^t +
k1
b+k1
(q^t + a3t)
i ) b+ k1
b(1  ) + k1

(32)
where k1 =
(1+)kK
c
CIA constraint: bct + bPt = bHt + bvt (A4)
Aggregate Supply: bct = (1  )(1 + K
c
)(a1t + bnt)  K
c
q^t (A6)
33The full derivation of the rst-order conditions and their log-linear formulation are described in section A of
the Technical Appendix, available from our webpages.
34The model is dened in the Matlab le gmvsys.m. Standard deviation and persistence structure of the stochastic
variables are dened in the driver le gmvdrv.m.
35The relationship is derived by setting b = B
P (1+RB)c
.
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Marginal cost: cmct = bnt + bwt   bct (A7)
Mark-up: cmct = bt   bt (A8)
Ination: bt = bpt   bpt 1 (A9)
Calvo pricing: bt = cmct + Etbt+1 + ut (A10)
Marginal Value of Collateralised Lending:
b
t = kK
bc+ kK
(bct   bqt   a3t)  bc
bc+ kK
bbt (A11)
reported in the main text as:
b
t = k2
b+ k2
(bct   bqt   a3t)  b
b+ k2
bbt
where k2 =
kK
c
:
Asset Pricing:36
bqt 1  k
( 
c
  1)

= [
(1  )
1 + 
+
mc
1 + 
(
n
K
)1 ]

Etbt+1   bt+ (1  )
1 + 
Etbqt+1 +
k

c

 bct   bt+ k
( 
c
  1)
b
t + a3t+
mc
1 + 
(
n
K
)1 

Et [cmct+1 + (1  ) (bnt+1 + a1t+1)] (A12)
reported in the main text as:
bqt = (1 + 1)Etbt+1   bt+ 1Etbqt+1   k
c bct + bt+
k
(

c
  1)
b
t + a3t+ 1Et [cmct+1 + (1  ) (bnt+1 + a1t+1)]
where 1 =
(1 )
1+
and 1 =
mc
1+
( n
K
)1 :
Government Budget Constraint:37
T bTt = H  bHt   bHt 1+ cbbbt   cb  1 +RB bbt 1   bt + bRBt 1 (A13)
36Note that in steady-state  = mc and
t+1
t
= 11+ :
37We dene the percentage deviation from steady state of ow and stock variables by lnxt   lnx, while for
interest rates and ratio variables they are Rt = R + bRt (rates) and rt = r + brt (ratio, assuming rt = xt=yt),
respectively. It can be shown the approximation comes from rst-order Taylor expansion: ex  1 + x, while for
rate variable: bRt  ln(1 +Rt)  ln(1 +R) and for ratio: brt = rt   r = ln(xt=yt)  ln(x=y) = bxt   byt.
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Bond Holding: bbt = "t (A14)
Riskless Interest Rate: bRTt = bt + Etbt+1   Etbt+1 (A15)
Liquidity Service of Bonds:38
1 +RB
1 +RT
 bRBt   bRTt  = 
c bct + bt 


c
  1


b
t (A16)
External Finance Premium: dEFP t = bvt + bwt + bmt   bct (A17)
Other Interest Rates:
bRt = bRTt   dEFP t (A18)bRLt = bRt + dEFP t (A19)bRDt = bRt (A20)
Policy Feedback Rule:
bRt = bt + t (A21)
Velocity:
bvt= t (A22)
For notational convenience the relevant log-linearised equations with variables denoting deviation
from steady-state are reported in the main text withoutb. We consider contemporaneous shocks to
a1; a2; a3; v: The benchmark model has 20 endogenous variables fc; n;m;w; q; P; ;mc;H; b;
; EFP;
RT ; RB; R;RL; RD; ; ; Tg, 5 lagged variables fP 1; H 1; c 1; b 1; RB 1g and 7 exogenous shocks
fa1; a2; a3; "; ; ; ug. The equations (A1) through (A22), 5 lagged identities construct the model to be
solved by King and Watson (1998) algorithm. Tables A1 to A3 provide a complete list of the endogenous
and exogenous variables of the model and their meaning. Steady state of transfer level, Lagrangian of
production constraint and base money depend on above parameters.
38Log-linearisation of interest rate is dened as di¤erence from steady state: Rt = R+ bRt:
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Table A1. The Variables in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)
c : Real consumption
n : Labour input
m : Labour input for loan monitoring, or banking employment
w : Real wage
q : Price of capital goods
P : Price level
PA: Aggregate price level
 : Ination
mc : Marginal cost
H : Base money
b : Real bond holding

 : Marginal value of collateral
EFP : External Finance Premium (RT - R)
LPB Liquidity Premium on Bonds
LPK Liquidity Premium on Capital (kLPB)
RT : Benchmark risk free rate
RB : Interest rate for bond
R : Policy rate
RL : Loan rate
RD : Deposit rate
 : Lagrangian for budget constraint (shadow value of consumption)
 : Lagrangian for production constraint
T : Real lump-sum transfer
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Table 1. The Information Content of Money for Output and Ination:
Robust Regressions on Simulated Data
t  4 t  3 t  2 t  1 t = 0 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 P F
Ination
Benchmark -0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.31 -0.60 -0.23 -0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.03 25.3
Banks dominant -0.22 -0.16 -0.06 0.06 0.20 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.05 3.7
Output
Benchmark 0.03 0.15 0.30 0.49 0.69 0.45 0.25 0.09 -0.03 1.23 93.1
Banks dominant -0.06 0.06 0.21 0.42 0.66 0.49 0.32 0.19 0.09 1.19 116.6
Note: the rst two rows show the lagged, contemporaneous and lead correlations between money and ination
for the benchmark shocks and for the banking shocks dominatecase. Rows three and four report the same for
output. An HP lter with  = 1; 600 is used. The nal two columns sum the coe¢ cients on money from a
regression of ination on lags of itself, and current and lagged terms in money and output as in King (2002) and
the F-test tests for joint signicance of the coe¢ cients using White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors from
500 random draws from the initial simulation of 10,000.
Table 2. Relative Gains
S.D. of 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
banking shocks
Welfare Approximation
Augmented 1 1 1 1 1
Taylor 0:987 0:985 0:983 0:982 0:982
Money 0:822 0:903 0:934 0:950 0:960
Targeting 0:459 0:477 0:481 0:482 0:483
Asset 0 0 0 0 0
Standard Loss Function
Augmented 1 1 1 1 1
Taylor 0:995 0:990 0:989 0:989 0:988
Money 0:862 0:934 0:957 0:970 0:976
Targeting 0:508 0:471 0:456 0:447 0:442
Asset 0 0 0 0 0
The relative gain Gain(x) = L(Asset Rule) L(Rule x)
L(Asset Rule) L(Augmented Rule) is
dened as the loss from the welfare approximation, L, obtained
from pursuing the policy rule x versus the less stabilising rule
(the asset rule), divided by the di¤erence between outcomes
obtained from pursuing the most stabilising rule (the augmented
rule) versus the less stabilising rule (the asset rule).
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Table 3. Correlation between Money, Ination and the EFP
Simple ination-targeting policy rule
Benchmark Shocks Banking Shocks Dominant
Dt t ct EFP t Dt t ct EFP t
Dt 1:34%  0:59 0:69 0:59 1:63% 0:20 0:66  0:21
t 0:06%  0:35  0:97 0:22% 0:27  1:00
ct 1:14% 0:30 1:2%  0:29
EFP t 2:98% 10:89%
Augmented policy rule
Benchmark Shocks Banking Shocks Dominant
Dt t ct EFP t Dt t ct EFP t
Dt 1:37%  0:88 0:71 0:64 1:41%  0:89 0:72  0:046
t 0:03%  0:69  0:56 0:03%  0:70 0:023
ct 1:13% 0:34 1:18%  0:17
EFP t 3:05% 11%
Note: The table reports standard deviations along the diagonals and correlations in the upper o¤ diagonal cells.
Dt denotes deposits, t is ination, ct is consumption and EFPt is the external nance premium. Variables are
taken as deviations from steady states using a HP lter.
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Figure 1: Optimal Weight on Money and EFP in Augmented Policy Rule. Note: On the x-axis we vary
the weight on the augmented term in the feedback rule, money minus the external nance premium, when banking
shocks are dominant i.e. by setting the standard deviation of the banking shocks to 0.05 and xing the standard
deviations of the real and monetary shocks to their benchmark values as in Table 3. On the y-axis we report the
welfare approximation Lt =
1
2
h
2c +

(1 )
 
n
c
  w
c

2   wc 2w   nc2n + mcc 2mc
i
which is computed as a
relative loss to the ination targeting case (zero weight on Money-EFP).
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Figure 2: Key Responses to Positive Collateral Shock under Benchmark and Augmented Rule
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Figure 3: Key Responses to Positive Monitoring Shock under Benchmark and Augmented Rule
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